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– Littoral Combat Ship
¨ Preliminary Findings
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Source: DSB Briefing, Dan Czelusniak, 12 June 1998











































































































Long development times increase the 
chance of technology obsolescence
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Issues with Linear Acquisition
¨ Serial, “big-bang” solution drove long cycle times
¨ Difficult to incorporate user feedback that reflected 
warfighter experience and evolving asymmetric 
threats
¨ Technology reach too long and process lacks 
flexibility for timely insertion
¨ Too much time for things to “go wrong” (budget 
instability, schedule changes, cost increases, new 
technology, requirements “creep” etc.)
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Software Development moved to Spiral Model
¨Spiral Development came out of the software 
community as a response to the high number 
of large software development failures
– The spiral model was defined by Barry Boehm in 
his 1988 article A Spiral Model of Software 
Development and Enhancement.
– The cyclical approach allowed users to provide 
feedback earlier and developers could identify 
potential trouble spots at an early stage. 
– He concluded that it “was particularly applicable 
to large, complex, ambitious software systems.”
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Concept is Extended to Weapon Systems
¨ May be less than full capability (…and less than fully tested), 
but…
¨ Affordable, risk-reduced, agile, and earlier delivery of a 
product
A “spiral development” acquisition process should 
be the  norm for long-term weapons and 
systems development to achieve lower cost, 
lower risk, and more rapid fielding.
A “spiral develop ent” acquisition process should 
be the  nor  for long-ter  weapons and 
syste s develop ent to achieve lower cost, 
lower risk, and ore rapid fielding.
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DoD Instruction 5000.2
¨ Evolutionary Acquisition (EA) Evolutionary acquisition is the preferred 
DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the user. 
Deliver capability in increments more quickly
– Allow for improvements and introduction of new technologies
– Balance needs and capabilities with resources 
– Take advantage of user feedback in refining requirements and capabilities
¨ There are two process approaches to evolutionary acquisition. 
– Spiral Development—Desired capability is identified, but end-state 
requirements are not known quantitatively at Program Initiation.
Requirements for future increments dependent upon technology maturation 
and user feedback from initial increments.
Evolutionary Acquisition is the preferred broad strategy to 
satisfy operational needs; while Spiral Development is the 
preferred process for executing such a strategy
Evolutionary Acquisition is the preferred broad strategy to 
satisfy operational needs; while Spiral Development is the 
preferred process for executing such a strategy
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Spiral Development
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Technology Readiness Level
This NASA graphic 
illustrates the progressive 
steps necessary to mature 
technologies and integrate 
them into subsystems, 
systems, and programs
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¨Less Risk (technical, schedule, cost)
¨Provide fielded capabilities earlier
¨Greatly reduces technological obsolescence
¨Allows for a more robust and competitive 
industrial structure
¨Less Cost
¨Less Risk (technical, schedule, cost)
¨Provide fielded capabilities earlier
¨Greatly reduces technological obsolescence
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Predator UAV
¨ Developed as an Advanced Concept 
Technology Demonstrator
¨ Initial requirement for inexpensive 
unmanned aircraft to provide real-
time reconnaissance
– Loiter up to 24 Hrs
¨ ACTD aircraft performance in 
Roving Sands 1995 exercises very 
successful, and led to deployment in 
Bosnia in summer 1995
¨ It performed so well that, decision 
was made to forgo formal engineering 
development  (SDD) and modify as 
technology and funding 
permitted—spiral development
Hellfire
Initial capability was delivered while requirements for 
upgrades were generated by feedback from operational use
Initial capability was delivered while requirements for 
upgrades were generated by feedback from operational use
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Predator UAV
¨ As a result of operational use, 
new requirement to strike time-
critical targets
– Armed with Hellfire missile
– Can carry laser designator
– Larger Predator B was 
developed to increase 
operational ceiling above 
icing and SAM threat
¨ Further improvements in work 
as the result of operational 
feedback are improved 
engines, sensors and increased 
payload
¨ Lessons learned from Iraqi 
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Predator UAV—Lessons 
¨ Program was successfully executed
¨ Used mature technologies
¨ Maintained cost requirement (for Predator A).  However, 
unintended consequence of cost limits may be to not fund or 
neglect support considerations, such as retrofits. 
The Predator is a great example. Warfighters identified a need and we made 
incremental improvements to the Predator in short order, sometimes in a 
matter of weeks. We develop them, test them and have them in the field.   
Lt. Gen. Jack Hudson
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, 4/25/08
The Predator is a great example. Warfighters identified a need and we made 
incremental improvements to the Predator in short order, sometimes in a 
matter of weeks. We develop them, test them and have them in the field.   
Lt. Gen. Jack Hudson
Commander, Aeronautical Systems Center, 4/25/08
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Global Hawk UAV
¨ Global Hawk system is a high altitude, 
long-endurance unmanned aircraft with 
integrated sensors and ground stations 
providing intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance capabilities. 
¨ After a successful ACTD, the system 
entered development and limited 
production in March 2001. 
¨ AF planned to slowly develop more 
advanced capabilities and acquire 63 
vehicles
With just one aircraft deployed, the system was credited with identifying 38 percent of 
Iraq’s armor and 55 percent of the time-sensitive targets using electro-optical, infrared, 
and synthetic aperture radar to target Iraqi forces.
Col. G. Scott Coal
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Global Hawk UAV
Johnson, Col Wayne and Johnson, Carl, The Promise and Perils of Spiral Acquisition: A Practical Approach to Evolutionary 
Acquisition, Acquisition Review Quarterly, DAU Press, Summer, 2002
The Original Spiral Strategy 
¨ First Spiral would deliver a baseline capability
¨ Additional spirals would follow rapidly, and drop capability into the production 
line when ready
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Global Hawk UAV
¨ March 2002, program was restructured to include a second, larger
model RQ-4B
– Total quantity was reduced to 51 AVs, 7 RQ-4A, and 44 RQ-4Bs
¨ December 2002, program was again restructured to change mission 
configuration
¨ RQ-4A production is complete 
– deployed in 2006 to support military operations 
¨ RQ-4B, with a 50% payload increase, larger wingspan (130.9ft) and 
longer fuselage (47.6ft), is in production with key technologies
mostly mature.
– Required major design changes such as new landing gear, electric
brakes, larger power-generating capability
¨ The resultant program shortened the schedule, while funding 
increased.
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Global Hawk UAV
19
Spiral Development May 14, 2008
¨ The Air Force added new requirements, but did not keep 
the cost targets
¨ Included immature technology, such as automatic 
contingency generation (an emergency, capability to 
autonomously determine the optimum flight path to divert to 
an alternative airfield).
 This requirement was after early production lots were 
negotiated
 Time spent trying to field ACG in the first baseline delayed 
delivery of the first production hardware and training 
courses 
 Capability deferred to a future software release
¨ Aggressive schedule increased program concurrency
Global Hawk UAV - Issues
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Littoral Combat Ship
¨ The Navy’s LCS is a surface combatant 
optimized for littoral warfare with:
– Fast, maneuverable, shallow draft
– Reconfigurable single mission focus
– Modular open systems architecture—
”plug-and-fight” mission packages
– Ship’s mission focus to be changed by 
changing out mission packages
¨ Primary intended missions are shallow-
water antisubmarine warfare, mine 
countermeasures, countering small 
boats, and intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance (ISR). 
¨ Secondary intended missions include 
homeland defense, maritime intercept 
operations, and support of special 
operations forces.
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Littoral Combat Ship
¨ The LCS is to displace about 3,000 tons, making it about the size of a 
Coast Guard cutter. 
¨ Maximum speed of about 45 knots, compared, to something more 
than 30 knots for the Navy’s larger surface combatants.
¨ Reduced “core” crew of 40 sailors, with  up to 35 or so additional 
sailors to operate the ship’s embarked aircraft and mission packages
– Total crew of about 75, compared to more than 200 for the Navy’s 
frigates and 300 or more for the Navy’s current destroyers and cruisers.
– Navy plans call for procuring a total of 55 LCSs, and a total of 64 
mission packages for the 55 ships.
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Littoral Combat Ship Acquisition Strategy 
¨ Two industry teams awarded contracts (Lockheed Martin and General 
Dynamics)
¨ The ship and mission packages were intended to be in spirals
– The first spiral of 15 ships, known as Flight 0, would be produced 
in two designs 
¨ The LCS program began production in December 2004
– Also began acquiring some elements of the mission packages 
¨ LCS is significantly different from other classes of warships in a 
number of ways. 
– an aggressive spiral development acquisition process 
– design of mission modules that allows each LCS to have the 
flexibility and adaptability
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Littoral Combat Ship—Issues
¨ Significant cost increases on LCS 1 (and projection of cost increases on LCS 
3) drove Navy to issue a stop-work order to Lockheed on construction on LCS 
3 in January 2007 
¨ Program restructured in March:
– Cancelled two LCS’s funded in FY2007
– Announced intention to lift stop–work order once contract was restructured from 
cost-plus to fixed price incentive 2007. 
– Also restructure GD contract for LCS 2 and 4 into a FPI-type contract
– Operational evaluation to select favored design, that would be procured with a full 
and open competition
¨ Overly optimistic cost estimate for sea frame ($216M in FY 05 to $531M in 
FY 09) 
¨ Building a ship requires precision sequencing-concurrent design and build 
strategy generated many design alterations, resulting in incomplete modules
¨ Commercial standard were considered (by Navy) as not adequate, required 
unanticipated design changes
Not a disciplined spiral development program
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Spiral Development Findings to Date
¨ Spiral development changes everything, and will require major culture change for both the 
user and acquisition community.
– Requirements— Users must allow more flexibility with their requirements 
• Users must accept less capable systems (80% solution) earlier, and then evolve to desired level in later 
blocks. 
• Acquisition team must develop a long-term system view, not a narrow focus on the current spiral
– Budgets
• Total program cost estimating is more difficult due to requirements evolution
• Cost must be viewed as a design constraint--otherwise program baselines may be less well defined
• Must budget for R&D in future blocks while current block is  underway
– Logistics
• Spiral development creates greater demands on logistics concepts
• different system configurations impacts on sparing, training, maintenance, etc
– Test and Evaluation
• Early operational feedback to shape development and formal testing 
• Test community must view partial capability of early blocks as a success
– Program Management
• Generates higher intensity of contract action
• Requires different skill mix in program office
• Planning for Spiral “N+1” is a critical Spiral “N” task
Spiral Development increases the need for disciplined program 
management
Spiral Development increases the need for disciplined program 
management
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Recommendations
¨ Use a true “spiral development” process as the norm for 
long-term weapons and systems development (in order 
to achieve lower cost, lower risk, and more rapid 
fielding).
 Based on proven technology, with a 5 year cycle goal for 
Block I, from milestone B to I.O.C.) and realistic budget 
funding
 With the option of competition (prime and/or subsystem) at 
each block (depending on performance and cost results from 
prior block)
 With R&D always being funded for subsequent blocks.
 By moving more towards an Open Architecture framework, 
programs can facilitate spiral development
Spiral Development Requires Better Planning, Discipline, and  
Communications and Collaboration with Developer, User, Contractor, 
and Tester in Order to Achieve Success
Spiral Development Requires Better Planning, Discipline, and  
Communications and Collaboration with Developer, User, Contractor, 
and Tester in Order to Achieve Success
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Conclusion
¨ Cold war era – Concentrated on Performance
¨ Pre 9/11 – Concentrated on Cost
¨ 9/11 into foreseeable future – We must Concentrate 
on Schedule
Shorter 
Acquisition 
Cycle Times 
Improved Performance
and 
Reduced Cost
Spiral Development
